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The current thaw in Greek-Turkish 
relations is particularly welcome to 
those of us with an interest in history.* 
Edhem Eldem wrote a fine article for The 
Historical Review, in which he said,
I find it impossible even to think of 
my area of study without referring to 
the multiple layers of Greek history 
that lie embedded in the fabric of late 
Ottoman history, and vice versa […] 
the kind of intimacy and total overlap 
that I find to be lying at the base of 
the complex relationship between 
Greek and Ottoman […] history.1
* Ottoman proper names are spelled in this 
review as per nineteenth-century usage.
1 Edhem Eldem, “Greece and the Greeks 
in Ottoman History and Turkish Historio-
graphy”, The Historical Review / La Revue 
Historique VI (2009), pp. 27-40, at p. 27.
The Isis Press of Istanbul is gradually 
publishing an extensive series of volumes 
of Ottoman diplomatic documents of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
and this is an initiative to be celebrated. 
It is possibly the first time that we in 
the West have been treated to hearing 
the Ottomans in their own words, and 
a variety of views and personalities 
emerge, making for an engaging and 
lively read. These were people grappling 
with problems in real time, with all the 
pressures of international relations, 
rumour, uncertainty and compromise 
that diplomatic work involves.  
The volumes under review here 
have excellent introductions. The index 
of writers reads like a Who’s Who of 
the Ottoman diplomatic world, and the 
indices of names and subjects facilitate 
navigation by theme. Sinan Kuneralp 
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from informers. The documents provide 
us with useful information even now 
and are a delight to read. We get a day-
to-day overview of gradually evolving 
and changing relationships: for example, 
France’s fears of Prussia, which drove 
her towards an entente with Russia, to 
the puzzled dismay and bewilderment of 
the Porte, something which must have 
been difficult for the diplomat A’ali and 
Bourée, who were friends.3
*
The two volumes covering the years 
1866-1869 provide a new and valuable 
prism through which to view the Cretan 
Revolt. This significant collection of 
documents offers us real insight, and 
you feel you come to understand the 
diplomats themselves and appreciate the 
difficulties they faced. If the Ottomans 
were feeling slightly overwhelmed, by 
clandestine Greek help for the Cretan 
Revolt, by the pouring in of volunteers 
and supplies, by the pouring out of 
refugees, by the frontier episodes in 
Thessaly and Epirus, by the creation 
of committees in favour of the Cretans 
in cities all over Europe, the United 
States and Russia, and by Great Power 
pressure to show moderation in 
pacifying the island, none of this shows 
in the documents. The Ottomans were 
no strangers to revolutionary uprisings, 
and they may well have thought that this 
revolt would burn itself out, providing 
there was no Great Power interference.
The Ottoman response took place 
on two levels: events on Crete and its 
3 John Vincent (ed.), Disraeli, Derby and 
the Conservative Party: Journals and Memoirs of 
Edward Henry, Lord Stanley, 1849-1869, Hassocks: 
The Harvester Press, 1978, p. 319.
has made a fine job of editing these 
books. He collected material scattered 
across many files in order to arrange it 
chronologically. This works well: the 
Porte would send a circular to its various 
representatives abroad, who would 
then send in their replies, covering not 
only the points raised, but how public 
opinion towards Turkey was faring, as 
well as advice and reflections on major 
issues of the day and local news. We thus 
get a comprehensive overview of events 
as they were unfolding throughout 
Europe. Another factor in their favour 
is that they are being published for the 
first time almost in their entirety, and 
have not been subjected to the selective 
processes imposed upon the Blue Books, 
Yellow Books or Red Books of other 
nations. On this process, George Finlay 
was particularly scathing, describing 
the British Blue Book on Crete as 
“full of padding to mystify Parliament 
and [omitting] important Russian 
and French Papers”.2 The Ottoman 
diplomatic papers were mainly for 
internal consumption. The language, 
whilst always deeply respectful, seems 
less formal than that of the British Blue 
Books, though this may be because they 
are in French. 
As sources to work with, these 
volumes give us a time frame of what was 
happening, and thus an accurate base 
line for cross reference, which may not 
necessarily be apparent in existing books 
or in the documents they were based on. 
Ottoman intelligence was impressive – 
from diplomatic and press sources, and 
2 Letter to Mowbray Morris, 23 January 1868, 
British School at Athens, Finlay Archive, E28.
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military reaction to them, and its own 
political and diplomatic agenda. The 
Porte’s concerns were to achieve the 
pacification of the island, resist border 
incursions and deal with the refugee 
situation; at a diplomatic level, they 
needed to fend off the collective note with 
its call for an international commission 
of inquiry, to assess and manipulate 
public opinion, and to take advantage of 
the shifting alliances in Europe. Finally, 
pushed to the limits of its patience, the 
Porte confronted Greek intransigence 
over refugee repatriation by issuing the 
ultimatum which led to a rupture in 
diplomatic relations.
The Ottomans had much to be wary 
of, which led to the constant claims of the 
total pacification of the island. There were 
the qualms of the governor-general that his 
failure to achieve pacification would lead to 
his dismissal, that the sultan’s displeasure 
would lead to ministerial changes; fears 
of foreign intervention at a diplomatic or 
even military level, fears of losing Crete to 
Greece, fears that this could indeed lead by 
a domino effect to the dismemberment of 
the empire. The constant mantra of “total 
pacification” proved counter-productive 
as it undermined Ottoman credibility, and 
European public opinion became sceptical.
It is remarkable how disciplined and 
ordered Ottoman diplomats were, often 
under very trying circumstances. There 
were frequent calls for instructions as 
to what line they should take, and what 
language they should hold. Some of the 
most vivid reports came from Russia, 
and for the St Petersburg scene we are 
much indebted to, and enriched by, the 
verbatim reports of Conéménos Bey. A 
Greek from Epirus, he held only the rank 
of chargé d’affaires, the post having been 
downgraded in the 1860s, according 
to Kuneralp “as a gesture of protest for 
Russian attempts to throw off the Paris 
Peace Treaty stipulations”. This meant 
that he did not enjoy as much respect 
as he would have had as a minister. At 
first Russia was cool about the Cretan 
Uprising, but as Conéménos was to 
write, “Arkadi changed everything.” 
Russia became enthusiastic, raising 
funds, sending corn via the Black Sea, 
and helping to transport refugees to 
Greece. An added incentive was the 
engagement of the young King George 
I of Greece to Olga, daughter of the 
Grand Duke Constantine, an event that 
cemented Greece to its Russian co-
religionists. Since the Ionian Islands had 
been ceded by Britain on the accession 
of the young king, there was hope that 
Crete might yet become their dowry.
For Conéménos, shunned by the 
Russians, aware of their monetary 
and moral support for Crete, with the 
imperial family and public opinion 
openly antagonistic to the Porte, life 
cannot have been easy. His was a hostile 
environment – the Russian Foreign 
Minister Gortschakoff, initially bullying, 
would demand to see him, sometimes 
getting him up from his sick bed in 
order to shout at him. Afterwards, his 
tone changed to one of silky forced 
amusement, the Russian cat playing with 
the Ottoman mouse. Later, possibly as 
Russian priorities changed from Cretan 
cession to Panslavism, there became 
space for friendship, and the daily 
enquiries after the health of Conéménos’ 
11-year-old daughter, who hovered for 
a month between life and death with 
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had not confirmed his new position, 
which, if cancelled, would have left him 
in severe financial straits.
Britain had been a staunch supporter 
of the Ottoman Empire from the time 
of their alliance in the Crimean War, 
but since then had adopted a strictly 
non-interventionist policy. For Musurus 
Pasha, the long-serving Ottoman 
ambassador to the Court of St James, life 
was much easier than for Conéménos 
and Danich Bey. He had very little 
hostile opinion to deal with, and his 
frequent interviews with the then foreign 
secretary, Edward Stanley, 15th Earl of 
Derby, were a way of testing the firmness 
of British policy, of seeking advice for 
pressing problems, and for probing the 
British foreign secretary’s opinion on 
what was happening in Europe – all to be 
faithfully relayed in his dispatches to the 
Porte. It is only through Stanley’s mildly 
exasperated diary entries that we learn 
that Musurus’ visits, several times a week, 
were too often and too long.4
Musurus’ two periods of heightened 
activity were in trying to get the blockade 
runner Arkadi seized before she left 
London, in which he was unsuccessful, 
and in making plans for the impending 
visit of Sultan Abdülaziz. The sultan’s 
visit to the Exposition Universelle in 
Paris in the summer of 1867 was much 
trumpeted – it was the first time a sultan 
had travelled beyond the borders of the 
Ottoman Empire. He went on to visit 
London and Vienna, and his trip was a 
public relations triumph. People became 
intoxicated with the splendour and 
exoticism of the East. It was hard work 
4 Ibid., pp. 280, 309, 312.
typhus fever, have something genuinely 
moving about them. Although Crete 
and Greece were ultimately left without 
Russia’s active backing, it was still 
Gortschakoff who supported Greece’s 
bid for a deliberative voice at the 1869 
Paris Conference.
Syros was the entrepôt at the hub of 
revolutionary activity. War materials, 
food, clothing and grain came in and were 
re-exported, the grain by now milled into 
flour. European volunteers made their 
way to Crete, often, like J. Hillary Skinner 
and Gustave Flourens, doubling as 
journalists. To begin with, men and goods 
were few and were transported by caique, 
an enterprise that became dangerous 
after the implementation of the blockade 
in September 1866. In the wake of the 
flood of sympathy following the siege of 
Arkadi, subscriptions were collected in 
London for the purchase of one of the 
blockade runners of the American Civil 
War, which had been returned for resale 
to the shipyard that had built her: the 
Dream became the Arkadi and arrived at 
Syros in February 1867.
On Syros, Danich Bey was serving 
as consul-general. He was a Roman 
Catholic, born Antoine Denis Dallegrio 
to a family which had emigrated to 
Istanbul from Tinos or Naxos with the 
formation of the Greek State. His was an 
unenviable posting – the whole island 
of Syros was in patriotic uproar, and on 
several occasions he went in fear for his 
life. Although his reports are graphic in 
their descriptions and in the difficulties 
of his situation, he was an efficient 
information gatherer. After these 
apprehensive years, he was posted to 
Corfu. In one of his last communications 
he expressed bitterness that the Porte 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 11/01/2020 02:11:45 |
Ottoman Diplomatic Documents 237
for Mehmed Fuad Pasha, who acted 
as both minister of foreign affairs and 
interpreter. Unfortunately, no record 
remains of the private conversations 
that took place with Napoleon III or 
with other statesmen. Europe became 
less condemning of the Empire, and 
Abdülaziz returned from his tour keen 
to implement further reforms. 
Djémil Mehmed Pasha was serving 
in Paris for a third term. His first was 
after the Crimean War, when he was one 
of the Turkish delegates at the Congress 
of Paris in 1856. He was a man of great 
experience, sent to keep a finger on the 
pulse of French foreign policy initiatives 
which tended to waver, as Kuneralp 
tells us, between Napoleon’s personal 
sympathy for nascent nationalities and a 
state policy which supported the integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire. It is touching 
that Djémil, in one of the longueurs of 
the Paris Peace Conference of 1869, 
caused by the political crisis in Athens 
to form a cabinet prepared to accept and 
sign the conference stipulations, went to 
Nice to visit the dying Fuad. 
In September 1866 Safvet Pasha, then 
Ottoman Ambassador to Paris, had been 
recalled to Istanbul where he later became 
acting minister of foreign affairs. He 
covered Fuad’s absence whilst the latter 
accompanied the sultan on his journey 
to Europe, a period of five months in 
which A’ali was on Crete making his 
investigation and report, which ended 
in the application of Organic Law; 
and again in the months when Fuad, 
nominally still minister of foreign affairs, 
was incapacitated by heart disease and 
had moved first to Florence and then to 
Nice. Safvet was fully aware of the Paris 
diplomatic scene and of the finely nuanced 
positions of his former colleagues, and his 
dispatches to Djémil, who had replaced 
him, are full of advice and concern. The 
crisis that led to the rupture between 
Greece and Turkey had developed over 
the repatriation of refugees. During the 
conflict on Crete, many families had been 
forced to leave their homes because of the 
fighting, in some instances because their 
villages had been burnt and in others 
because of fears of reprisals, and in cases 
where villages had submitted to Ottoman 
authority. Another cause was starvation, 
due to two years of uncultivated land and 
unharvested crops, and to marauding 
troops from both sides who were living 
off the land.
The Ottomans were against taking 
people away from Crete, but the fears 
and rumours had become too great for 
the Powers to ignore. (The former would 
have been surprised to hear that their 
views were shared by the great American 
philanthropist and philhellene Samuel 
Gridley Howe, who raised money, 
bought food and clothes, and came to 
Crete to oversee their distribution.)5 The 
Porte asked that the refugees should be 
5 Samuel Gridley Howe, The Cretan 
Refugees and their American Helpers: A 
Statement Addressed to the Contributors for 
the Relief of Cretan Refugees, Boston: Lee 
and Shepard, 1868; Greek transl. as Κρήτες 
πρόσφυγες και οι Αμερικάνοι ευεργέτες τους, 
Athens: Ekati, 2010; id., Appeal to the People 
of the United States to Relieve from Starvation 
the Women and Children of the Greeks of the 
Island of Crete, Boston: George C. Rand & 
Avery, 1867; Laura E. Richards (ed.), Letters 
and Journals of Samuel Gridley Howe, Vol. 
II: The Servant of Humanity, Boston and 
London: Dana Estes & Co. and John Lane, 
1909, pp. 537 ff.
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Financially it would have been in the 
interests of Greece to divest itself of 
the refugee burden as soon as it could,8 
but the Central Committee possibly 
contended that having a large population 
of Cretan refugees in Greece was a step 
towards annexation and proof that the 
insurrection was still alive.
It was the constant battle of trying 
to repatriate refugees, despite Greek 
government promises that help was at 
hand, that finally made Fotiades lose 
patience and suggest to the Porte the 
need for an ultimatum. Greece refused 
to accept its five points, which led to 
a rupture in diplomatic relations. The 
various diplomatic papers relating to 
the conditions under which the Paris 
Peace Conference would be held make 
fascinating reading. Greece, given only a 
consultative voice and not a deliberative 
one, refused to participate. Gortschakoff 
worked hard to try to get this changed, 
but it was one of the conditions the 
Ottomans had stipulated for their own 
participation. Even Lord Clarendon, 
writing to William Gladstone, felt that 
this had been a mistake.9
8 On 1 November 1867, Stanley wrote in 
his journal, “Erskine writes…that the Greeks 
are getting tired of having to feed the Cretan 
refugees, of whom there must between 30 
and 40,000 in Greece. They cost £20,000 a 
month, or one-fourth of the whole revenue 
of Greece.”; cited in Vincent (ed.), Disraeli, 
Derby and the Conservative Party, p. 320.
9 London, British Library, Add. MSS, 
44133, Gladstone MSS, Clarendon to 
Gladstone, private, 16 January 1869. Cited in 
Domna Dontas, Greece and the Great Powers: 
1863 to 1875, Thessaloniki: Institute for 
Balkan Studies, 1966, p. 147.
transported to other parts of the empire, 
but the Powers transported them to 
Greece, a fact greatly resented by the Porte 
as interference in their internal affairs. 
Greece had to take out a loan to support the 
refugees. Numbers are normally quoted as 
being about 60,000, but the more accurate 
figure, based on an attempt to count their 
numbers in different localities, is in the 
region of 40,000.6 As the months went 
by, the refugee situation became more 
wretched. Although they were away from 
the fighting and from trying to survive in 
caves on the mountains or by the shore, 
they were away from their homesteads and 
living at subsistence level on an allowance 
that would barely keep them in bread 
and water. Gradually there were petitions 
to return. The Powers were in no mood 
to help, and it was left to the Ottomans 
to charter ships. What was unexpected, 
and to some extent inexplicable, was the 
opposition this engendered. Refugees 
were not given free passage to the ships. 
Their repatriation was strongly opposed, 
often violently, and Fotiades Bey, the 
Ottoman minister at Athens, was reduced 
to arranging embarkations at night. 
The constant scuffles were blamed on 
agents of the Greek Central Committee.7 
6 For refugee numbers, see Kuneralp (ed.), 
The Cretan Uprising, 1866-1869, Part 2, no. 
1140, p. 342. 
7 Finlay, in an article published 
anonymously in the Levant Herald (2-12-
1868), Finlay Archive, E35, p. 51, put the 
original enthusiasm for emigration down to 
an attempt to “cause an intervention of the 
European Powers”. This sentence appears 
only in the ms. version, Finlay Archive, E28, 
pp. 194 ff, and has been edited out of the 
printed version.
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Some of the most thoughtful 
dispatches were written by Rustem in 
Florence, who always gave sympathetic 
and considered advice. This contrasts 
with Aristarchi Bey in Berlin, who had 
no interest whatsoever in Cretan affairs, 
and Glavani Effendi, chargé d’affaires at 
Brussels, with his virtuoso overviews of 
world politics. Blacque Bey had been sent 
to Washington to counter the influence 
of William J. Stillman, the American 
consul on Crete, and the strong streak 
of philhellenism in the United States, 
especially in Boston, where Howe 
published a paper called The Cretan, 
which ran to seven issues. Blacque Bey 
had the difficult task of trying to find 
out about, and block, the sale to Greece 
of ships from the plentiful supply of 
blockade runners and monitors left over 
from the American Civil War. His reports 
on a nation that was healing its wounds 
and moving forwards are interesting. 
Greece was a small country with 
very little infrastructure, a young and 
inexperienced king, a rapid turnover 
of ministries, and a belief in the Megali 
Idea. It had a view to expanding its 
borders to absorb Crete, Epirus and 
Thessaly – Macedonia was to follow – 
and it was almost bankrupt. It had great 
difficulties in raising loans, partly as no 
payments on the 1824 and 1825 loans 
had been made, and in fact could not be 
made until the redemption of the 1832 
loan.10 A loan of 28 million drachmas 
10 “In their present note the Three Powers 
expressly forbid the disposal on the part of the 
Greek government of any of the resources of 
the State towards the settlement of the said 
loans of 1824-25.”, The Times (28-1-1865), 
Finlay Archive, E34, p. 7. When an attempt was 
was raised for the purchase of ships and 
war materials in 1867,11 and a further 
loan of 12 million drachmas to support 
the refugees was contracted in 1868.12 
The financial burden could be said to 
made in November 1868 to put one million 
drachmas towards the 1824-1825 loans, 
“dictated by the necessity imposed on Greece 
of restoring the credit of her Government”, 
this caused Great Power protests, and the 
proposed payment had to be withdrawn. All 
payments on earlier loans were suspended 
until full payment of the 1832 “Bavarian Loan” 
had been completed. This, however, did not 
prevent Greece, after some difficulties, from 
contracting the 1867 loan. The Times (16-11-
1868); see the Finlay Archive, E35, p. 50, and 
E28, p. 88, for the ms version.
11 For the 1867 loan, see The Times (19-4-
1867), in which Finlay stated, “The proceeds 
are expressly set apart for the purchase of 
ships and materials of war.”, Finlay Archive, 
E34, p. 115. War expenses were said to be 
running at one million drachmas a month, 
“about half the net receipts of the Greek 
Government during 1866”, the source of 
which Finlay ascribed largely to Russia; The 
Times (11-5-1867), Finlay Archive, E34, 
p. 116. See also Panayiotis Petrakis, Public 
Borrowing and the Development of Some Basic 
Bank Figures, 1844-1869, Athens: MIET, 1994, 
p. 47 [bilingual Greek-English publication].
12 For the 1868 loan, see Petrakis, Public 
Borrowing, p. 48. By the spring of 1867, 
expenses for refugee support were already 
£500 per month, as reported by the Anglo-
Greek Committee in The Times of 10 May, 
Finlay Archive, E34 p. 115, and by November 
1867 they were estimated to be £20,000; 
see note 8 above. Much of the money was 
raised by private subscription. Howe himself 
collected $37,000 for refugee relief; see 
Richards (ed.), Letters and Journals of Samuel 
Gridley Howe, p. 540. 
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were always carefully considered. Of 
course, questions remain, but they 
remain unanswerable. Might Crete 
have got a better settlement, and might 
more bloodshed have been avoided, if 
they had accepted A’ali’s offer of almost 
anything short of annexation? If Russian 
pressure had lasted a little longer, might 
Stanley have changed his mind in favour 
of Crete? Some of his diary entries 
hint tantalisingly towards it.13 Despite 
everything, it is a story of hope, which 
13 On 21 July 1867 Stanley noted that on 
the occasion of the sultan’s visit to London, 
Fuad had said that whilst Turkey would not 
give up Crete, “they might yield it to force, 
if the Great Powers chose to use force…”; 
Vincent (ed.), Disraeli, Derby and the 
Conservative Party, p. 314. On 16 September 
1867, “[T]he idea of Cretan annexation 
appears at last dropped by Gortschakoff…
due partly to the Emperor’s interview with 
Fuad”; ibid., p. 317. On 28 October 1867, 
“Buchanan writes that the Russian Foreign 
Office…talks of non-intervention in Crete”; 
ibid., p. 320. On 4 November 1867, “Fuad 
is supposed to think, that if it comes to 
cession, there will be less loss of dignity in 
yielding to an intervention of all the Great 
Powers than in offering fresh terms to the 
insurgents…”; ibid., p. 321. On 5 November 
1867, “The Greek Minister [called], who 
seems convinced that Crete will be at last 
annexed to Greece: in which I suspect he is 
right.”; ibid., p. 321. On 1 December 1867, 
“Ignatieff once again holds violent language, 
saying that Crete must be annexed to Greece, 
nothing else will now settle the question. I 
begin to think he is right.”; ibid., p. 324. In a 
short aside on the Eastern Question, Vincent 
wrote, “Russian pressure ceased at almost the 
same time as Stanley had first shown himself 
willing to consider the cession of Crete to 
Greece as practicable.”; ibid., p. 330.
have been the first nail in the coffin of 
the uprising.
It was an undeclared war, fought 
surreptitiously against superior odds, 
by people who used every means at 
their disposal. It is remarkable with 
what panache the uprising was carried 
out, with clandestine help from the 
Greek government, from Russia and the 
Greek diaspora, in total contravention 
to treaties and to international law. The 
uprising had begun quite legally with 
a petition to the sultan in May 1866. 
Had this been answered promptly, fully 
redressing the grievances which had been 
aired, might the whole episode have been 
avoided? Probably not. The two months’ 
delay, during which time troops were 
brought in and a negative proclamation 
was issued, did not help, but neither did 
the Cretan desire for annexation, which 
was bubbling irrepressibly to the fore.
Finlay, as Times correspondent, took a 
more distanced and acerbic view, striving 
after truth, trying to cut back on what he 
considered exaggerated reports of fighting, 
of atrocities, of numbers – constantly 
chiding Greece for its shady political and 
financial dealings. As a young man he had 
fought in the Greek War of Independence 
and, now in his sixties, he criticised the 
strategic incompetence of the central 
committees, with plenty of warlords but 
no clear leadership, and a constant waste 
of resources.
The extent of Turkish forbearance, 
often under very trying circumstances, is 
remarkable. Despite constant provocations, 
the diplomats were able to separate the 
substance of what was happening from 
the noise and babble that accompanied 
it. They managed never to lose their calm 
and measured tones, and their decisions 
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ended with the promulgation of Organic 
Law, which gave fairer representation 
to the Christians and led to a decade of 
peace. It was a valuable first step, even 
though it took almost another 50 years, 
until the settlement following the Balkan 
Wars, for Crete to achieve annexation.
*
The volume on the Cretan Question 
covering 1899-1913 has been published 
ahead of the one that will cover the 
years 1870-1898, so for the moment 
there is a gap of some 20 years during 
which time much changed. Leadership 
and participation was based less on 
central committees, warrior priests 
and volunteers, and more on the 
“bleeders and pleaders”14 of the nascent 
middle class. By now the Cretans were 
marginally less inclined to resort to 
revolt (though the threat remained) and 
more likely to seek political solutions for 
their grievances. Chania was beginning 
to be transformed into a prosperous 
Neo-classical town.
These final Ottoman diplomatic 
documents on the Cretan Question have 
an uneven distribution and thin coverage 
for the early years. Just at the point at 
which we hope for fresh insight on the 
final steps leading to annexation in 1913, 
the volume finishes with a flurry of 
correspondence about raising quarantine 
regulations. The last document is dated 
18 February, a full ten months before the 
end of the story. This is not, however, 
the fault of the editor – the documents 
are simply missing from the files. It is to 
be hoped that if they reappear we might 
14 R. A. H. Bickford Smith, Cretan Sketches, 
London 1898, p. 119.
be offered a slim addendum. The editor 
also draws our attention to the fact that 
“Intradepartmental memoranda and 
notes to and from foreign missions in 
the Capital are not available.” [p. 8]. 
Although it leaves the denouement still 
unresolved, there is enough interesting 
material to make the book well 
worthwhile. The documents are useful 
in confirming dates, but at no point do 
they tell us the whole story. Momentous 
events take place during these years, such 
as the deposition of the sultan and the 
coming of Ataturk, troubles in Albania, 
Bulgaria and Yemen, Goudi, and the 
Balkan Wars, but these happen largely 
off-stage with no more than a glancing 
mention in the text.
Whilst too sparse to give us the full 
Ottoman narrative, this volume does 
provide a unique window on fluctuating 
Ottoman thought. Since Crete had been 
placed under the control and jurisdiction 
of the Powers in March 1897, and 
following the departure of the Ottoman 
troops in 1898, the Ottomans had been 
deprived of any real power. Their role 
had devolved into preventing the island’s 
annexation to Greece, complaining 
vociferously to the Powers at the creeping 
Hellenisation that was taking place, and 
trying to protect, with a certain amount 
of indignation, Ottoman sovereign rights 
and amour propre. For Ihsan Bey, minister 
plenipotentiary at Madrid, “le succès de 
notre cause est étroitement lié à la juste 
ténacitié avec laquelle nous soutiendrons 
nos droits” [no. 411]. If tenacity was the 
basis of Ottoman strategy with regard to 
Crete, it was, however, also the forte of 
the Greeks.
Prince George of Greece, newly 
appointed as high commissioner, arrived 
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thus have a situation in which, on the 
one hand, Greek national hopes were 
for enosis, with the royal family working 
hard towards achieving it, whilst, on the 
other, Turkey was trying equally hard to 
block any progress towards annexation. 
The Greek government, meanwhile, was 
being remarkably quiescent, and several 
documents comment on its correct 
behaviour. The position of the Powers 
was no less fraught. Following the 1898 
massacre at Heraklion on 6 September, 
which led to the forced removal of 
the remaining Ottoman soldiers on 5 
November, Crete had been placed under 
the protection of the Powers, in what has 
been called “the first real ‘peacekeeping’ 
operation of the modern idiom”.16
The deteriorating situation led to 
Venizelos’ 1905 Theriso Uprising, taken 
by Prince George as a personal attack. It 
led the Powers to take seriously Cretan 
complaints about the regime and to 
put an end to the repeated abuses 
engendered by the administration. The 
petulant prince threatened to resign, 
and on 21 December 1905 Naby Bey 
wrote to Tevfik Pasha from Paris that, 
at the instigation of Britain, a financial 
commission would shortly depart for 
Crete to study what reforms could be 
implemented. The results of the report 
were anxiously awaited in Turkey, 
and a copy was obtained “not without 
difficulty” by Rifaat in Athens and 
sent to Tevfik on 28 May 1906 [no. 
313]. Turkish anxieties focused on the 
16 Robert Holland, “Nationalism, Ethnicity 
and the Concert of Europe: The Case of the 
High Commissionership of Prince George 
of Greece in Crete, 1898-1906”, Journal of 
Modern Greek Studies 17 (1999), pp. 253-276.
on Crete on 9 December 1898. His over-
riding aim was to achieve enosis, or 
union, with Greece. Initially he was 
wildly popular as the Cretans embraced 
the appointment of a Greek prince as an 
important first step towards annexation. 
The first documents of the book inform 
us of the prince’s travel schedules, as 
he went cap in hand to Europe to plead 
the cause of annexation to his wider 
family, the king of England and the tsar 
of Russia, and their governments. His 
travels turned out to be disappointing, 
as neither ministers nor monarchs were 
keen to upset the status quo.
The princely pursuit of enosis was 
shortly to conflict with the views of the 
emerging Eleftherios Venizelos, who 
in 1898 had been part of the committee 
which had drawn up the Cretan 
constitution. With hindsight this had 
invested too much power in Prince 
George, who acted as “central agent 
of the state, and the main executive 
officer, and an important member of the 
legislature”.15 Clashes between Prince 
George and Venizelos began in 1901, 
with the prince insisting on pursuing 
enosis, which Venizelos thought 
premature. As Prince George began to 
take advantage of the constitution and to 
reduce the hard-won privileges that had 
been granted in the Halepa Convention 
of 1878, the relationship between the 
prince and a few of his politicians 
became increasingly acrimonious. We 
15 A. Lilly Macrakis, “Venizelos’ Early Life 
and Political Career in Crete, 1864-1910”, in 
Paschalis M. Kitromilides (ed.), Eleftherios 
Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2006, p. 69.
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political complications that might arise 
should the commission overstep its 
mandate. Although to some extent it 
did, the ensuing report covered only 
economic and administrative measures 
and, to the relief of the Turks, did not put 
forward any recommendations towards 
a definitive solution.
The Powers, sympathetic to the 
difficulties which had come to light 
in the commissioners’ report, made 
a statement, reported by Rechid to 
Tevfik from Rome on 12 June 1906, 
“que l’Angleterre aurait promis ses 
bons offices à la Grèce en vue de régler 
la situation de la Crète dans un sens 
favorable aux aspirations helléniques…” 
[no. 314]. From this moment the Powers 
had effectively backed themselves into 
a corner. Having hinted at  an eventual 
annexation to Greece, it was impossible 
to come up with any compromise by 
which Turkish sovereign rights could be 
guaranteed, although Turkish suzerainty 
was not in dispute. Thus began a seven-
year prevarication, which became the 
dominant theme in these reports. It 
caused great frustration to Greece and 
Turkey, and also to Crete, which began to 
take the law into its own hands through 
a gradual process of Hellenisation, to 
which the Powers for the most part had 
an uneasy tolerance, with the occasional 
swift redress, as when they sent “4 
bâtiments de guerre pour procéder 
abaissement drapeau Hellénique hissé à 
Candie” [no. 566].
The Turkish position could only 
be defensive. Since the jurisdiction of 
Crete had been taken over by the Powers, 
which had undertaken to respect Turkish 
suzerainty and to protect the lives and 
goods of the native Muslim population, 
there was little that Turkey could do 
bar suggest alternative solutions, and 
complain at Cretan transgressions as 
the pace of Hellenisation accelerated. 
The protests were impassioned and 
instantaneous, usually with the aim of 
preventing or obstructing the latest Cretan 
“impertinence”: the raising of the Greek 
flag, the issue of coinage with the image 
of King George, the recruitment of Greek 
ex-army officers for the gendarmerie, 
the hearing of court appeals in Athens, 
the issue of Greek postage stamps, the 
application of new recruitment laws, 
the threatened application of the new 
Greek constitution, and the appointment 
of Greek engineers, and also of a judge 
from the Court of Appeal in Athens. In 
one instance the official papers of an 
incoming Ottoman ship were confiscated 
and replaced by new documentation 
bearing the legend “Government of King 
George”. 
The most serious violation was the 
way in which Muslims were prevented 
from taking up the public offices to 
which they had been elected because 
they refused to take an oath in the 
name of King George. This was to have 
a knock-on effect, as, without Muslim 
functionaries, the religious tribunals 
could not operate. Thus in Heraklion, 
the newly appointed naib was by-passed, 
and Muslims had to go to Rethymnon 
or Chania for a hearing, which led to 
additional expenditure of time and 
money, and which could put them into 
a life-threatening situation. There were 
also the questions of the occupation 
of Heraklion’s Muslim quarter and 
the transformation of a mosque into a 
church, though, in an earlier incident, 
the accidental damage of a mosque was 
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or have statements made in the House 
of Commons or in the press. In one 
instance the incumbent refused, saying 
he could not ask for further reassurance 
in writing when this had just been 
given verbally. While this insistence is 
understandable, given that the issue was 
to probe the Powers’ commitment to 
continuing Ottoman sovereign rights on 
Crete, it also became a myth to which the 
Ottomans clung, but neither side fully 
believed in. Only Sir Charles Hardinge 
challenged it, suggesting “Il faudrait 
mieux envisager les choses au point de 
vue pratique et ne pas se montrer trop 
intransigeant.” [no. 406]. The situation 
was one in which it was quicker and 
easier to offer reassurances than to 
tackle the deeper issues, which would 
lead to Ottoman disillusion, lengthy 
negotiations between the Powers, and 
additional expense: in other words, 
the Eastern Question complications 
everyone was so anxious to avoid. As a 
result, courteous diplomatic relationships 
prevailed, and reassurances appear to 
us as shorthand for non-intervention 
in a situation deemed too complex and 
dangerous to unravel. The moment was 
always “inopportune”, either because of 
internal factors – if Crete is quiescent 
then leave it be – or because of external 
factors, obliquely referred to but not spelt 
out, as diplomats were trained to write 
about one subject per dispatch. Hence, 
Crete sometimes appears to have been 
operating in a vacuum with regard to 
what was happening in the outside world.
Ottoman diplomats, perhaps because 
of their powerlessness, appear to have 
become warily on edge and ready to jump 
down the throat of any rumour, as when 
Hardinge expressed “son étonnement 
put down to high spirits on the last day 
of carnival, and not to malicious anti-
Muslim provocation.
The Muslim situation caused real 
grounds for concern. The Ottomans 
had been against the withdrawal of the 
international troops in July 1909, fearing 
that this would lead to general anarchy 
and problems of Muslim security. The 
Powers agreed to leave a naval presence 
and a small contingent of troops. 
Though there were sporadic murders, 
mainly in the Rethymnon area, the 
numbers had not increased substantially 
since the troop withdrawals. Of the 
eighteen murders of Muslims in the 
following two years, nine had been 
committed by Christians, seven by 
Muslims, and two were unsolved. 
Both British and French ministries of 
foreign affairs felt the issue of Muslim 
security to be exaggerated, though the 
emigration of Muslim families and a 
general movement towards the cities tell 
their own story. The Ottoman argument 
was that the murder of Muslims made 
a bad impression on public opinion in 
Turkey, and weakened the confidence 
of the population in the justice and 
equity of the Powers, who had assumed 
responsibility for safeguarding Muslim 
lives and possessions.
The relationship between Ottoman 
diplomats and the Powers is interesting. 
The Ottoman diplomats seem to have 
been well liked, though the various 
foreign ministers had a tendency to 
make reassuring noises rather than reach 
for solutions. This is partly because the 
Ottomans were being continually asked 
by their own foreign ministry to seek 
reassurance. If it were given verbally, 
they were pressed to get it in writing, 
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de voir que nous nous inquiétons à tout 
propos et nous basons nos démarches si 
non sur des suppositions du moins sur 
des nouvelles erronées” [no. 687]. In 
another example, the Ottomans feared 
the arrival of a Cretan commission to 
purchase 12 large calibre cannon to 
protect the Cretan coast. Mallet said it 
was absurd, as they had no money for 
such a venture. Tevfik reported that this 
“a été surement mise en circulation en 
vue de nous impressionner.” [no. 915]
We get another, more honest and 
exasperated view of the impasse and 
the contradictions within it from the 
Turkish ambassador at Rome. The 
hawkish Hakky, who from time to time 
ironically recommended shooting the 
flag or sending in troops, wrote to Rifaat 
on 3 August 1909, “D’ici là la Crète me 
parait destinée à rester un pays unique 
en son genre: L’Europe maintiendra 
un ‘statu quo’ mal défini, Souveraineté 
Ottomane pour nous, union avec la 
Grèce pour les Crétois et Dieu sait quel 
mélange d’espoirs et désespoirs pour le 
Royaume” [no. 521]. Nearly a year on, 
Osman Nizami Pasha wrote to Rifaat 
from Berlin to report the German view of 
the Cretan Question. Germany foresaw 
a loss of accord among the Powers, and 
revolt in Greece on the day that a full 
autonomy under Turkish sovereignty 
was declared, which would be likely to 
cost King George his throne. Osman 
Nizami commented, “C’est là-dessus 
que comptent les quatre Puissances pour 
esquiver une solution définitive qui les 
obligerait de se mettre ouvertement en 
contradiction avec les promesses faites 
dans le temps à la Grèce.” [no. 817]. In 
ten months no progress had been made, 
and it was no wonder that Turkey, Crete 
and Greece were suffering from an 
overwhelming sense of frustration.
All parties saw the solution as 
straightforward. For Turkey, it was a 
matter of full autonomy under Turkish 
sovereignty. Ottoman diplomats put 
forward a variety of alternative solutions, 
but they were not seriously discussed. 
These were for Crete to become an 
autonomous principality like Samos, or 
to have a status “similar either to pre- and 
post-1885 Rumelia, or pre-1908 Bosnia 
and Herzegovina” [p. 13]. One diplomat 
put forward the case for partition. The 
Ottomans even rejected the idea of Crete 
being leased in exchange for tribute, 
which had worked for Egypt in the 1860s.
For Greece and Crete, it was simply a 
case of annexation, though for Venizelos 
it was a question of timing; he preached 
autonomy and patience, and annexation 
in due course. This, however, caused him 
personal difficulties, as he came to be 
considered a traitor to the cause. When 
he came out in favour of annexation 
rather than autonomy, the Turks 
recognised it as a necessary political 
move, a recognition possibly facilitated 
by Venizelos’ personal friendship with 
the Turkish chargé d’affairés, Ghalib 
Kémaly Bey. Turkish fears were that 
any “amputation” would have a domino 
effect in the Balkans and possibly lead 
to the loss of their territories in North 
Africa. It could also have a negative 
effect on public opinion in Istanbul, 
which could destabilize the new Turkish 
regime. It was certain that if autonomy 
under Ottoman sovereignty were to 
be promulgated, the Cretans would 
continue their struggle: “L’autonomie 
n’a jamais empeché l’annexation, et 
leur caractère turbulent fera le reste.” 
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trouble, Venizelos immediately suspended 
Greek parliamentary proceedings until 
1 October, to encourage the deputies to 
return to Crete.
The Powers’ relationship towards 
Turkey, Greece, each other, and towards 
public opinion, is also revealing. At 
one point, Hakky mentioned that they 
should never forget that European public 
opinion favoured Greece, “inexplicable 
et bizarre mais réelle” [no. 503]. France 
was considered philhellenic under 
Clemenceau, but by July 1910 Deville had 
had enough. He affirmed confidentially 
that “le sens de réalité faisant totalement 
défaut aux Hellènes il ne pouvait être 
leur ami…”. Naby assured him that the 
new regime had already recognised the 
strength and sincerity of the French 
attitude towards Turkey.
Italy fluctuated much more, at 
some times being openly pro-Greek, as 
when she suggested that Greece should 
consolidate her relations with Crete, 
and that Italy would help in case of 
complications. At other times she leant 
towards a solution favourable to Turkey. 
Although La Consulta, the Italian 
ministry of foreign affairs, was very much 
at the centre of events as the meeting 
place of the ambassadors in Rome, and 
thus as a conduit for information, Italy, 
as a small Power, was unwilling to take 
the initiative and was ready to fall in 
with the prevailing mood of the Powers. 
Despite the Italo-Turkish War which 
broke out in September 1911 when Italy 
attacked Tripoli, Crete remained neutral 
and Italy continued to participate in 
Cretan affairs. The gendarmerie was 
efficiently run along Italian lines, with 
Italian officers in charge.
[no. 817]. As the English foreign 
secretary warned, it would be unwise 
to force on the Cretans any solution 
that was unacceptable to them. Cretan 
impatience was punctuated by periodic 
announcements of annexation, of which 
the Powers took very little notice, and 
an occasional rise in tension which 
spilled over into the Theriso Uprising 
of 1905 and threatened to do so again 
in 1910. This led the Powers to send 
down warships, with troops whom the 
consuls could call upon if they thought 
the situation demanded it.
The two issues which caused 
the Turks the greatest anxiety were 
Muslim security and the manipulation 
of Cretan election dates to coincide 
with those of Greece, in order to send 
deputies to the Greek parliament. To the 
Ottomans, it was casus belli, and in the 
documents they considered a retaliatory 
reoccupation of Thessaly. The dangers 
were well recognised by the Greeks, 
who did their best to keep the Cretans 
out of the parliament. The Cretans sent 
their deputation in tiny groups to avoid 
detection and at one stage succeeded in 
entering. The atmosphere was electric 
– a few cheers, and a stunned silence. 
Venizelos granted an interview to the 
Cretan deputy, General Lympritis, in 
which he explained that they could 
not be recognized as representing the 
population of the Hellenic Kingdom 
and thus for reasons of internal order, 
and to avoid external complications, he 
could not permit them access. Should 
they persist in trying to gain entry, 
the government would be obliged to 
oppose them by force. These events were 
reported by Moukhtar Bey to Assim Bey 
on l June 1912, and, to dodge further 
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Austria and Germany had no wish to 
be involved in negotiations, surmising that 
these would be protracted, and that their 
presence would merely complicate the 
issue by unleashing rivalries and raising 
secondary questions. They were prepared 
to go along with any solution acceptable 
to Turkey. German non-involvement 
was a disappointment to Turkey, given 
that by the first decade of the twentieth 
century Germany and Turkey had many 
interests in common, such as the German 
reorganisation and training of Ottoman 
military forces, and the construction of 
the Berlin-Baghdad railway. Meanwhile, 
Britain, despite a little froideur which was 
corrected with fulsome statements to the 
House of Commons, remained resolutely 
pro-Turkish, the only country to follow 
faithfully the stipulations of the Treaty of 
Berlin.
Russia played a close hand. Although 
Husny Pasha, Ottoman ambassador 
to St Petersburg, reported delightedly 
that Prince George’s “projet n’aurait 
pas rencontré un accueil favourable à 
Livadia” [no. 21], it was wishful thinking, 
as the tsar had “accepted the Bosnian 
model for Crete”.17 However, this did 
not prevent Russia from acting firmly 
in support of the status quo. Together 
with the other Powers, she had rejected 
the proposition for the introduction of 
a Greek administration to the island, 
and said she would do the same again. 
Although Djévad believed “que la 
Russie est nécessairement favorable aux 
Grecs” [no. 395], Greek public opinion 
17 Robert Holland and Diana Markides, The 
British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, 1850-1960, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 111-112.
was despondent. The journal To Άστυ 
complained, “La Grèce était en droit 
d’espérer protection de la Russie, mais 
elle a été détrompée.” [no. 272]. It was 
said that Russia was not pro-Greek 
because of Greek hostility towards the 
Slavs, yet as an Orthodox country neither 
could she come out in favour of Turkey. 
The Russians also claimed that the 
dowager empress (King George’s sister) 
and Queen Olga blocked their liberty of 
action. None of this prevented Russia 
from an occasional swipe at “les procédés 
enfantins et agacants des Crétois” [no. 
668] or describing their movement as 
“théatral” [no. 1062]. If Russian support 
seemed to lean towards Turkey, the 
latter was never entirely convinced that 
Russia was not giving Greece clandestine 
encouragement [p. 12]. 
Greater freedom of the press in 
Turkey gave rise to a volatile public 
opinion, which was taken into account 
by the foreign ministry when it suited 
them. The diplomats were not above their 
own press manipulations, as when it was 
suggested that the rich and influential 
American press magnate James Gordon 
Bennett should be lavishly entertained 
in Paris, in order to counter his anti-
Turkish stance, which was thought to 
have emanated from the dethronement of 
the Sultan Abdul Hamid, who had once 
received him in Istanbul. On another 
occasion, Osman Nizami suggested 
guiding public opinion by asking 
“whether or not there was any advantage” 
in hastening a definitive solution. By 
insinuating doubt, whilst at the same time 
giving strong official assurances as to the 
efforts that were being made to reach a 
rapid solution, he felt the government 
was covered for either eventuality. In 
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as the Cretan Question reached its final 
stage. The complete Isis series on the 
Eastern Question and on the origins of 
World War I will be a useful and lasting 
tribute to turbulent times, and a fine 
complement to the commemorations 
that will take place in 2013 for the 
centenary of Crete’s annexation. These 
are valuable books, and they deserve 
a wider readership than they will 
probably get. What is important is that 
they should be taken into account by 
anyone trying to write the history of this 
period. Until now we have experienced 
the hand of the Porte as a shadowy and 
overshadowing dimension, seen only in 
propaganda and usually disadvantageous 
proclamations. Now we have the chance 
to set the record straight. Our view has 
been dramatically enhanced by the 
publication of these diplomatic reports: 
intelligent, thoughtful, full of insights 
and well-gathered intelligence, which 
answer many long-pondered questions.
In conclusion, I would like to feel 
we are working towards a time when 
sources can be shared freely and writing 
can take into account both sides of a 
given narrative. Sinan Kuneralp is doing 
admirable work in making such sources 
available. It now remains to see how 
historians come to reappraise the past, and 
to see if their readers can come to accept 
that their previously received views may 
not tell the whole story. Each era needs 
its own interpretation of history. The next 
generation of historians will be able to 
carry this work forward to new levels of 
understanding. Only then will we be able 
to see both sides of the picture. 
Rosie Randolph
Researcher, 
Cretan Revolution of 1866-1869
the meantime, in Greece, King George 
entertained the financial commissioners 
who had reported on Crete at the 
palace, to try to influence them towards 
annexation, and possibly also to try to 
restore some of the prestige he felt Prince 
George had lost on Crete.
*
A review is too short to be able to analyze 
the many interesting themes that are 
suggested by these documents, such as 
the evolution of the internal political 
situation on Crete, or Venizelos’ rising 
influence in Greece. Suffice it to say 
that there is enough useful material for 
these books to be of great value, but 
there are lacunae. Some occur through 
the chance survival of some documents 
over the random loss, misfiling or 
destruction of others. There is, however, 
also the editorial decision not to print 
enclosures and, for what would probably 
have amounted to less than 50 extra 
pages, the reader is deprived of many 
contemporary nuances.
The books are valuable for the insight 
they give us of the Ottoman mindset, 
specifically the frustration at trying to 
achieve a restitution of Crete to the 
Ottoman fold through the retention of 
their sovereign rights, despite knowing 
that their power over it could never be 
restored. We can see Crete slipping 
ineluctably through their fingers 
even whilst the echoes of the Powers’ 
resolution to leave their ships “comme 
une manifestation de leur resolution de 
maintenir le statu quo” [no. 1186] ring on. 
These books are both feast and famine. If 
you do not expect them to answer specific 
questions, you will be well rewarded by 
this useful addition to our knowledge 
of the workings of Ottoman diplomacy 
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